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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103 (2)(a) and § 10-3-1106(6)(a).
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are of central importance to the appeal: Utah Code Ann.
§67-21-3(l)(a); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5; and Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5. Their text is included verbatim in Addendum A attached
hereto.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
First Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in finding that, during his employment
with Midvale City, Petitioner mishandled evidence and/or property that came into his
possession, in violation of Midvale City Police Department Policy?
Standard of Review:

"When reviewing the factual findings made by an

administrative agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d
177, 181 (Utah 1997).
Second Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in finding that Petitioner committed an
act of theft and misappropriation of property when he copied photographs that another
officer had downloaded to Petitioner's assigned computer onto Petitioner's personally
owned CD, despite the fact that Midvale City failed to state the elements of theft and
misappropriation to the Appeals Board and failed to present any evidence to support the
allegation?
1

Standard of Review: Mixed question of fact and law. "When reviewing the
factual findings made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will generally
reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."

Drake v.

Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Questions of law are reviewed
for correctness. See State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).
Third Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in finding that Petitioner intentionally
viewed pornographic materials on his City-owned computer in violation of Midvale City
and Police Department Policy?
Standard of Review:

"When reviewing the factual findings made by an

administrative agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d
177, 181 (Utah 1997).
Fourth Issue:

Did the Appeals Board err in including as an element of

termination Petitioner's delivery of a CD containing lewd photographs of Midvale City
employees to the Utah Attorney General's Office, in light of the Utah Protection of
Public Employees Act?
Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).
Fifth Issue: Did the Appeals Board err in including as an element of termination
Petitioner's reporting of a public safety hazard directly to the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco
and Firearms, in light of the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act?
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Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).
Sixth Issue:

Did the Appeals Board err in concluding that termination of

Petitioner was the proportionate and appropriate discipline for Petitioner's alleged
violations of policies?
Standard of Review: Mixed question of fact and law. "When reviewing the
factual findings made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will generally
reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).

Drake v.

Questions of law are

reviewed for correctness. See State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 30, 2008, Petitioner Jack Guenon (hereinafter "Guenon") was placed on
paid administrative leave pending an investigation of Guenon5s conduct as a police
officer with Midvale City (hereinafter the "City"). R. 219. On or about October 31,
2008, Guenon's employment with the City was terminated. R. 222. In its Disciplinary
Order, the City set forth five specific bases for the termination. Id.
Guenon appealed his termination to the Midvale City Employee Appeals Board
("Appeals Board"), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. R. 1-134. A hearing
before the Appeals Board was held on November 20, 2008 and December 1, 2008. Id.
On December 10, 2008, the Appeals Board upheld the termination, finding that the City
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had proven all five of its stated reasons for the termination. See Addendum B. Guenon
timely filed this appeal on December 22, 2008. See Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Allegations
At the time it terminated Guenon's employment, the City furnished Guenon with a
Disciplinary Order detailing the City's findings and conclusions. R. 222-223. The Order
sets forth five specific grounds for Guenon's termination, as follows:
[Guenon] handled evidence, namely, driver's licenses, credit cards,
state identification cards, immigration identification cards, and
Mexico Identification cards. These items were found in [Guenon's]
police vehicle in violation of Police Department General order 13l.a).
[Guenon] found and otherwise possessed private personal property,
namely, a DVD/CD. [Guenon] admitted making copies of it and
distributed these copies to other individuals. This is an act of theft
and misappropriation of property of another. This act is in violation
of Police Department General Order 6.01.4 and City Policy
Standards of Conduct, page 61.
[Guenon] viewed pornographic materials on [Guenon's] City-owned
computer between the months of November 2007 and August 2008
for non-departmental purposes in violation of Police Department
General Order No. 17-3 and City Policy Computer Systems Internet
and Electronic Communication Policy, pages 49 and 50.
[Guenon] committed at least two known separate acts of
insubordination by failing to follow the chain of command by doing
the following:

1

Respondents failed to include two key items - the Appeals Board's findings and
conclusions and Guenon's Petition for Review - in their preparation of the record.
Guenon attaches them to his brief as Addenda B and C, respectively.
4

Failure to follow chain of command, namely delivery of a
DVD/CD to the attorney general's office and making
complaints against fellow officers. (Department Policy No.
106.5.) (City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 61.)
Reporting of alleged ATF violations to ATF in lieu of
reporting the violations to City personnel. (Department
Policy No. 106.5.) (City Policy Standards of Conduct, page
61)
R. 222.
On December 10, 2008, the Appeals Board upheld The City's termination of
Guenon. In its findings and conclusions, the Appeals Boards found that The City had
proven each of its five bases for termination by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Addendum B.
Identification Cards
Six current and former officers of the Midvale Police Department testified about
the City's evidence policy. R. 76: pg. 233 (2-25); R. 77: pg. 234 (1-8); R. 79: pg. 242
(11-14); R. 84: pg 262 (6-12); R. 90: pg. 287 (18-25)-pg. 288 (1-9); R. 91: pg. 292 (1-8);
R 93: pg. 301 (2-9).

The Department policy technically requires officers to book

evidence into the evidence room at the end of their working shift.

However, officers

often take identification cards from suspects but do not formally charge those suspects
with crimes directly relating to the identification cards. Id. In those situations, the
officers do not book the identification cards into evidence. Id. Rather, the officers'
common practice is to shred the cards, throw them in the garbage, leave them lying
around the police station, or store them in their police vehicles. Id. With the exception of
Guenon, The City has never disciplined an officer for storing identification cards in his
5

vehicle or for otherwise failing to book them into evidence. R. 56: pg. 152 (1-4); R. 77:
pg. 234 (1-8); R. 79: pg. 242 (11-14); R. 84: pg 262 (6-12); R. 90: pg. 287 (18-25)-pg.
288 (1-9); R. 91: pg. 292 (1-8); R 93: pg. 301 (2-9).
There is no evidence to suggest all of the identification cards found in Guenon's
vehicle were cards he had personally taken from suspects but failed to place into
evidence. For the last several months of Guenon's employment, every officer in the
Department had access to his police vehicle. R. 93: pg. 300 (1-25). There is a pegboard
in the Department containing spare keys for each police vehicle. R. 56: pg. 152 (24-25)pg. 153 (1). In addition, in the fall of 2007, the City revoked Guenon's ability to drive
his police vehicle home when off-duty. R. 93: pg. 300 (1-6). Thus, while off-duty,
Guenon's vehicle was stored at the police station and was available to, and driven by,
other on-duty officers when the need arose. R. 93: pg. 300 (11-15).
Theft
Upon being transferred into the Detectives' Division, Guenon was assigned a
computer workstation. R. 57: pg. 155 (18-21). The workstation had previously been
assigned to a Sgt. Egan. Id. When Sgt. Egan vacated the workstation, he left behind a
CD containing certain photographs. R. 57: pg. 156-159. Sgt. Egan had also downloaded
the photographs onto the computer's hard drive. Id. When Guenon was assigned to the
workstation, he found the CD and also discovered the photographs on the computer hard
drive. Id. Guenon downloaded the photographs from the hard drive to a blank CD that
Guenon owned. Id. Guenon left Sgt. Egan's CD in the desk drawer. Id. At no time did
Guenon take possession of or misappropriate Sgt. Egan's CD. Id. Guenon did not
6

distribute the CD he had copied to any third party except for the Attorney General. R.
59: pg. 165(2-15).
At the Appeals Board hearing, The City failed to mention the elements of theft and
misappropriation of property to the Appeals Board.

Nor did the City present any

evidence to rebut Guenon's testimony.
Pornography
City policy forbids police officers from intentionally viewing pornography on
City-owned computers. R. 277-278. The laptop computer in question was in Guenon's
possession for approximately nine months. When a computer visits a web site, every
photograph on that site is imprinted onto the computer's hard drive. R. 81: pg. 253 (215). Only three pornographic GIF files and a few vulgar cartoon images were found on
the computer's hard drive for that entire time frame. R. 27: pg. 107-108.
The few pornographic images found on Guenon's computer were sent to him
unsolicited by third parties as Instant Messenger emoticons and/or via email. R. 62: pg.
174 (24-25), pg. 175-176; R. 83: pg. 258 (1-24). Guenon had no control over what was
being sent to his computer, but if he received images he deemed to be vulgar or offensive,
he immediately closed them. Id. Sgt. Hodgkinson, the Police Department's computer
technology manager, could not determine whether the few pornographic images found on
Guenon's computer had been downloaded by Guenon and conceded they could have been
sent by third parties to Guenon. R. 29: pg. 115-116(1-13). Sgt. Hodgkinson could not
determine whether Guenon had solicited any of the images. Id.

1

The City sent Guenon's laptop to a forensic specialist to determine the extent of
pornography viewed on Guenon's computer. R. 13: pg. 49 (14-25)-pg. 50 (1-4). The
forensic examiner stated that when a person is actively seeking out and viewing
pornography on a computer, vast amounts of images will show up imbedded on the
computer's hard drive. R. 176. After a review of Guenon's laptop, the forensic examiner
concluded that Guenon was not actively seeking pornography on the laptop. Id.
Insubordination
Some of the photographs Sgt. Egan downloaded onto his workstation computer
depicted minor children in the presence of a female officer wearing a sheer negligee that
revealed the officer's breast and nipples. R. 58: pg. 160 (25)-pg. 161 (1-7). At the time
Guenon furnished his CD containing the photographs to the Attorney General, Guenon
reasonably believed that the photographs depicted acts of lewdness with a child, a class A
misdemeanor as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5. R. 58: pg. 161 (11-18).
In late 2007, the City purchased 50 pounds of explosives which it began storing in
two different rooms located in the police station. R. 22: pg. 88 (10-14). The manner in
which the explosives were being stored was a public safety hazard and violated
regulations of the ATF. R. 185-186. The City knew of the ATF violations but failed to
act because it lacked money to purchase an approved magazine. R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25); R.
183-186. Guenon first reported this violation to his direct supervisor and then directly to
the ATF.

R. 74: pg. 222 (18-25)-pg. 223 (1-7); R. 63: pg. 180 (5-8).

The ATF

investigated the charge, found that the way the explosives were being stored was a public
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safety hazard, and ordered the City to immediately move the explosives to an approved
magazine. R. 185-187.
The Utah Protection of Public Employees Act prevents employers from taking
adverse action against employees who report violations of law to the authorities.
Moreover, the relevant City policies do not define the term "insubordination" and do not
proscribe Guenon's conduct.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Identification Cards
The City has a written policy requiring officers to book evidence into the evidence
room at the end of their working shifts. However, the common practice among City
officers was to not book identification cards into evidence when identification-related
offenses were not being charged. Officers routinely left identification cards lying around
the station or in their cars, as corroborated by the testimony of six different officers and
the photographs of discarded identification cards. Many officers simply shredded the
cards or threw them in the garbage. There is no practical difference in shredding a card
or keeping it in one's vehicle. Furthermore, with the exception of Guenon, the City has
never disciplined an officer for failing to book evidence. The City cannot single out one
employee for discipline while turning a blind eye to other employees engaging in the
same conduct.
Theft
When Guenon was assigned to a City computer, he discovered that the officer
previously assigned to the computer, a Sgt. Egan, had uploaded questionable photographs
9

onto the hard drive. Sgt. Egan had also copied the photograiphs onto a disk which he left
in a desk drawer next to the computer. Guenon downloaded the photographs from the
computer hard drive onto a disk he owned. Guenon never took possession of Sergeant
Egan's CD. Nor did Guenon distribute the CD he had copied to any third party except
for the Attorney General.
Guenon could not have committed theft because he never took possession of
another's property. Guenon did not deprive Sgt. Egan of his property. At the Appeals
Board hearing, the City presented no evidence that Guenon had committed theft. The
City did not even mention the elements of theft and misappropriation to the Appeals
Board. Thus, the Appeals Board could not possibly have assessed the sufficiency of the
evidence on those charges.
Pornography
The City failed to show substantial evidence that Guenon intentionally viewed
pornography on his City-owned computer. Even though Guenon had been assigned the
computer for several months, the City only found a handful of images. Those images had
been sent to Guenon by third parties via email or the Instant Messenger program. When
this occurred, Guenon immediately tried to delete them.

An independent forensic

examiner hired by the City concluded that Guenon was not actively searching for
pornography. The City's witness, Sgt. Hodgkinson, admitted the few images found on
Guenon's computer could have been sent to Guenon unsolicited via e-mail. The City
policy only prohibits the intentional viewing of pornography.
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Guenon cannot be

disciplined for receiving unsolicited pornographic images, as Guenon has no control over
the content of those messages.
Insubordination
Guenon's conduct of reporting a suspected crime to the Attorney General and a
known public safety hazard to the ATF was protected under the Utah Protection of Public
Employees Act. Furthermore, there is no City policy specifically requiring officers to
report crimes and safety hazards to superiors prior to reporting them to outside
governmental agencies. Guenon9 s conduct does not fall within the parameters of the City
policy on insubordination, which was the basis for Guenon's termination.
Proportionality
The City's disciplinary action - termination - was excessive and not proportionate
to Guenon's actions.

Guenon followed a common practice within the Department.

Guenon did not intentionally view or solicit pornography. There is no evidence that
Guenon stole or misappropriated property, and Guenon's reporting to the Attorney
General and the ATF were protected under Utah law. Termination was also excessive in
light of Guenon's exemplary record and commendations.

11

ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 has been interpreted by this Court as conferring upon

"civil service employeefs]... a vested right to continued employment absent a legal cause
for termination." Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Com 'n, 949 P.2d 746, 753 (Utah
App. 1997). The burden of proof was on The City to show it had sufficient cause to
terminate Guenon's employment as a police officer. The City failed to meet its burden,
and the Appeals Board's upholding of the termination was therefore improper.
The Appeals Board made several factual findings pertaining to Guenon. "When
reviewing the factual findings made by an administrative agency, an appellate court will
generally reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake
v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). "Substantial evidence" has
been defined as evidence adequate enough to convince a reasonable mind to support the
conclusion. Allen v. Department of Workforce Services, Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005
UT App 186,118, 112 P.3d 1238.
Guenon also questions whether the Appeals Board correctly applied the law.
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness and "appellate review gives no deference
to the trial judge's or agency's determination..." Id; See also State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). Mixed fact/law questions may require a more flexible standard
allowing the appellate court to review an issue "with varying degrees of strictness";
therefore the standard may fall anywhere between a review for "correctness" and a
"substantial evidence" standard. Drake, 939 P.2d at 181.
12

The Appeals Board should have made two inquiries when reviewing Guenon's
appeal: "(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department head, and, if so, (2)
do the charges warrant the sanction imposed?" In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356,
1361 (Utah 1986).

The Appeals Board concluded that termination was the proper

measure of discipline. This Court must determine "whether discipline is appropriate and
second whether the particular discipline meted out is proportionate to the offense." Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com% 908 P.2d 871, 876 (Utah App.
1995). An exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip the
balance against termination. Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 116 P.3d 973, 978 (Utah App.
2005).
EL

THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT GUENON
MISHANDLED EVIDENCE WHEN GUENON WAS FOLLOWING THE
COMMON PRACTICE WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT,
After Guenon was placed on administrative leave, Captain Shreeve performed an

inventory of Guenon's police vehicle. R. 19: pg. 74 (23-25); pg. 75 (1-5). Captain
Shreeve testified that he found 44 various identification cards. Id. The relevant Midvale
Police Department Policy states as follows:
Property shall be placed in evidence before the end of an officer's
shift. Evidence and property should not be stored in an officer's car,
desk, locker, or office.
R. 265. In terminating Guenon, the City alleged that Guenon violated this policy. R.
222. At the Appeals Board hearing, Police Chief Mason reiterated that one of the reasons
Guenon was terminated was for mishandling evidence. R. 5: pg. 18 (6-14).
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Guenon testified that his understanding of the evidence policy was that an
identification card should only be booked into evidence when the suspect from whom it
was taken is charged with an offense directly relating to that card. R. 55: pg. 146 (1125); pg. 147 (1-4). Of the 44 identification cards found in Guenon's vehicle, none was
connected to a report charging a suspect with an identification-related offense. R. 55: pg.
147 (10-16). Guenon also testified that he had seen other officers shred identification
cards, throw them away, and leave them in cars or around the office. R. 56: pg. 151 (2024). Guenon testified that, to his knowledge, no other officer had ever been disciplined
for mishandling identification cards. R. 56: pg. 152 (1-4).
At least six current and former officers of the Midvale Police Department also
testified about their understanding of the evidence policy.

Each officer stated that,

despite the technical requirement of the policy, it was common practice within the
department not to book identification cards into evidence when no identification-related
offense had been charged. Sgt. Greg Olsen testified that he did not believe there was a
policy on how to handle identification cards taken from suspects where no identificationrelated offenses were being charged. R. 75: pg. 228 (5-11). He testified that "it was a
gray area" within the department and that he had seen identification cards in other
officer's vehicles, discarded in the patrol room, and thrown in a garbage can. R. 75: pg.
228 (12-25), pg. 229 (1-8). Sgt. Olsen also stated that officers do not book identification
cards into evidence when no identification-related crime is being charged because the
cards will never be used in court and it wastes space in the evidence room. R. 76: pg. 233
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(2-25); R. 77: pg. 234 (1-8). It was common practice at Midvale for the officer to either
shred the cards or throw them away. R. 77: pg. 234 (3-8).
The other former and current Midvale officers all agreed with Sgt. Olsen's
testimony regarding the practice of handling identification cards in the department. See
R. 79: pg. 242 (11-14); R. 84: pg 262 (6-12); R. 90: pg. 287 (18-25), pg. 288 (1-9); R. 91:
pg. 292 (1-8); R 93: pg. 301 (2-9). Officer Ken Davis testified that it was the common
practice for officers to shred identification cards, throw them in the garbage, leave them
lying around the police station, or store them in their police vehicles, rather than book
them into evidence. R. 84: pg. 264 (1-14). Officer Davis took several photographs,
which were admitted into evidence, that showed discarded identification cards and
license plates lying around the police station. R. 162-171.
Former Midvale Officer Josh Woffinden (referred to as Wilkington in the Record)
testified that he often saw identification cards strewn around the patrol room and that that
practice had been ongoing for the last couple of years. R. 90: pg. 288 (7-12). Sgt. Ken
Jarvis testified that it was common to find identification cards lying around the report
writing room and in patrol cars. R. 93: pg. 301 (10-17); R. 95: pg. 307 (7-19). Sgt. Jarvis
explained that he had never reported or disciplined any officer for that practice because it
seemed to be the standard practice at Midvale. Id. Many of the officers also testified that
they were unaware of the City ever disciplining an officer, with the exception of Guenon,
for violating the technical requirements of the evidence policy. R. 75: pg. 229 (9-14); R.
85: pg. 268 (6-10); R. 90: pg. 289 (2-5); R. 93: pg. 301 (21-25).

15

The City also failed to show that the 44 cards found in Guenon's vehicle were
cards he had personally taken from suspects. For the last several months of Guenon's
employment, every officer in the Department had access to his police vehicle. R. 93: pg.
300 (1-25). There is a pegboard in the Department containing spare keys for each police
vehicle. R. 56: pg. 152 (24-25)-pg. 153 (1). In the fall of 2007, the City revoked
Guenon's ability to drive his police vehicle home when off-duty. R. 93: pg. 300 (1-6).
Thus, while off-duty, Guenon's vehicle was stored at the police station and was driven
by, and available to, other on-duty officers when the need arose. R. 93: pg. 300 (11-15).
The undisputed evidence presented to the Appeals Board was that the common
practice among City officers was not to book identification cards into evidence when
identification-related offenses were not being charged.

Officers routinely dealt with

those cards in a haphazard way, sometimes shredding them, throwing them away, or
leaving them in their vehicles or lying around the station. Those officers were never
disciplined for this behavior. Guenon merely followed the common practice of handling
evidence which had developed within the Department.

The City cannot single out

Guenon for discipline after having turned a blind eye to other employees engaging in the
same conduct.

16

IIL

THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT GUENON
COMMITTED AN ACT OF THEFT AND MISAPPROPRIATION OF
PROPERTY WHEN HE COPIED PHOTOGRAPHS OF ANOTHER
OFFICER WHICH HAD BEEN DOWNLOADED TO A CITY OWNED
COMPUTER
ASSIGNED
TO
GUENON
ONTO
GUENON'S
PERSONALLY OWNED CD,
The second finding supporting Guenon's termination was that Guenon:
found and otherwise possessed private personal property, namely, a
DVD/CD. [Guenon] admitted making copies of it and distributed
these copies to other individuals. This is an act of theft and
misappropriation of property of another. This act is in violation of
Police Department General Order 6.01.4 and City Policy Standards
of Conduct, page 61.

R. 222. The Appeals Board could not have found this by substantial evidence. First, the
City did not present the Appeals Board with the elements of the alleged crimes. Second,
the City did not present any evidence of theft or misappropriation. Third, the Appeals
Board itself acknowledges that it was unsure whether Guenon's conduct rose to the level
oftheft.
The City failed to state the elements of theft and/or misappropriation of property
to the Appeals Board. Midvale City Policy states that "[e]ach officer must know and
abide by the law" and continues with "Critical Offenses...Theft of any kind." R. 274.
The City Policy does not provide a definition of theft or misappropriation of property.
Therefore, one is left to assume that the definitions are those found in the Utah Code.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 states: "A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 states in relevant part: "A person commits wrongful
appropriation if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another,
without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily
17

The Appeals Board could not possibly assess the sufficiency of the evidence against
Guenon for theft and misappropriation of property when the elements of those offenses
were not provided by the City to the Appeals Board.
In addition, the City failed to show substantial evidence that Guenon did in fact
commit an act of theft or misappropriation of property. Guenon was assigned a particular
City computer and workstation to perform his work. R. 57: pg. 155 (18-21). The
computer and workstation had formerly been assigned to Sgt. Egan. Id. When Sgt. Egan
left the workstation, he left a CD containing certain photographs in a desk drawer. R. 57:
pg. 156-159. Sgt. Egan had also downloaded those photographs onto the workstation
computer but did not delete them from the hard drive. Id. While assigned to that
workstation, Guenon found the photographs on the computer hard drive. Id. Guenon
downloaded them onto a blank CD he owned.

Id.

At no time did Guenon take

possession of or misappropriate Sergeant Egan's CD. Id.
Under the criminal statutes for theft and misappropriation, a key element is the
deprivation of property from its lawful owner. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; § 76-6404.5. Guenon could not "steal" the photographs, as they had been embedded in the hard
drive of his assigned computer and clearly abandoned by Sgt. Egan. Guenon did not
deprive Sgt. Egan of his property.

Furthermore, the City was unclear who the

photographs belonged to once Sgt. Egan left the workstation. When asked whether the
photographs had become City property, Chief Mason stated, "I, I couldn't tell you. I
appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal
custodian of possession of the property."
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think you're trying to lead me down a path that I just don't really know where, where it's
leading." R. 13: pg. 49 (7-13).
Based upon the scant evidence produced at the hearing, the Appeals Board could
not have rationally concluded that Guenon had stolen property. Indeed, in its findings
and conclusions, the Appeals Board never specifically finds that he did. Rather, the
Appeals Board only states that the "taking, copying and distributing the photographs to
others may be an act of theft and misappropriation of property... ." See Addendum B. It
goes on to say that Guenon did not "have the right to copy files from the city's computer
and possess them," without providing any City policy or other legal basis for such a
statement. Id. The Appeals Board also concluded that Guenon "made copies of the
photographs and distributed these copies to other individuals" without any factual basis
whatsoever. The City provided no evidence of this. Guenon testified that the only third
party he turned the photographs over to was the Attorney General. R. 59: pg. 165 (2-15).
For these reasons, the Appeals Board's finding that Guenon stole or misappropriated
property is not supported by substantial evidence.
IV.

THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN FINDING THAT GUENON
INTENTIONALLY VIEWED PORNOGRAPHY ON HIS CITYOWNED COMPUTER.
The third finding of Guenon's termination upheld by the Appeals Board was that

Guenon:
viewed pornographic materials on [Guenon's] City-owned computer
between the months of November 2007 and August 2008 for nondepartmental purposes in violation of Police Department General
Order No. 17-3 and City Policy Computer Systems Internet and
Electronic Communication Policy, pages 49 and 50.
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R. 222. City policy forbids employees from intentionally viewing pornography on
City-owned computers. That policy states, in relevant part: "[t]he use of city-owned
computer resources to intentionally view, download, or send pornography, sexually
explicit materials or materials with sexual content is prohibited.55 R. 277-278 (emphasis
added). At the hearing, the City showed that three pornographic GIF files and a few
vulgar cartoon images had been found on the hard drive of Guenon5s City-owned laptop.
R.27:pg. 107-108; R. 28: pg. 111:9-25.
Former Midvale Officer Parsons Metzkow (referred to as Metscal in the record)
testified that Midvale officers utilized a real-time internet chat program known as Instant
Messenger to communicate with one another. R. 79: pg. 244 (18-25)-pg. 245 (1-7).
Officer Metzkow stated that each Instant Messenger user has the ability to send images
and Emoticons (emotional icons) to other users. R. 80: pg. 246 (5-18). The recipient has
no control over the images he receives, other than to close out of the program.

Id.

Officer Metzkow testified that the images found on Guenon5 s computer were Instant
Messenger Emoticons that had been sent by third parties to Guenon. R. 83: pg. 258 (124).
Guenon testified that he never used his City computer to visit pornographic
websites unrelated to his police work. R. 59: pg. 165 (16-22). Guenon also testified that
at times he had received e-mails from third parties containing unwanted pornographic
images.

R. 61: pg. 171 (10-22).

When Guenon received these images he would

immediately close them. Id. Ken Davis testified that, like Guenon, he often received
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unsolicited pornography in his personal email account and simply deleted it. R. 86: pg.
271 (8-16). Guenon confirmed that the few pornographic images found on his computer
had been sent to him unsolicited by third parties via Instant Messenger or e-mail. R. 62:
pg. 174 (24-25); pg. 175-176.
The City did not present any evidence that Guenon intentionally viewed
pornography. Sgt. Hodgkinson, the Police Department's computer technology manager,
testified that he could not determine whether the few pornographic images found on
Guenon5s computer were intentionally downloaded by Guenon and conceded that they
could have been sent by third parties via e-mail to Guenon. R. 29: pg. 115-116 (1-13).
Sgt. Hodgkinson could not determine whether Guenon had solicited any of the images
found on his computer. Id. While the City used a filter software program to prevent
most pornographic images from being sent to City e-mail accounts, that software would
not have prevented pornographic images from being sent to an officer's personal e-mail
account. R. 31: pg. 123 (17-25)-pg. 124 (1-20).
When Guenon was placed on administrative leave, the City sent Guenon's laptop
to a forensic specialist to determine the extent of pornography viewed on Guenon's
computer. R. 13: pg. 49 (14-25)-pg. 50 (1-4). The forensic examiner found that a search
of the computer's HTML files (internet websites) and e-mails revealed no pornographic
material. R. 174. The forensic examiner stated that when a person is actively seeking out
and viewing pornography on a computer, vast amounts of images will show up imbedded
on the computer's hard drive. R. 176. This is consistent with Officer Metzkow's
testimony that when a computer visits a web site, every photograph on that site is
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imprinted onto the computer's hard drive. R. 81: pg. 253 (2-15). The forensic examiner
concluded that "[t]here were...several graphics which appeared to be pornographic in
nature, but not enough to suggest that the user was actively searching for pornography on
this computer." Id. (emphasis added). Sgt. Hodgkinson had no reason to disagree with
the forensic examiner's opinion that Guenon was not actively searching for pornography.
R. 31: pg 122 (7-20).
In sum, the City failed to show substantial evidence that Guenon intentionally
viewed or solicited pornography on his City-owned computer. Guenon denied it. Both
Officer Metzkow and Guenon stated that the few images found were Instant Messenger
emoticons that had been sent by third parties to Guenon. Guenon explained that this was
unsolicited. Officer Metzkow testified that all of the images contained in websites visited
by Guenon would have been embedded into the hard drive. Despite the fact that Guenon
had used the laptop for several months, only a handful of pornographic images were
found. The forensic examiner opined that there was no evidence Guenon was actively
searching for pornography. Sgt. Hodgkinson had no reason to disagree with that opinion,
and could not rule out that the few images found may have been sent, unsolicited, to
Guenon's computer.
Neither the City nor the Appeals Board utilized the correct standard in determining
Guenon violated the pornography policy.

That policy only proscribes intentional

conduct. R. 277-278. However, the City never alleged that Guenon's conduct was
intentional. R. 222. It is telling that at the hearing, Chief Mason incorrectly stated that
any viewing of pornographic material, intentional or not, was a violation of City policy.
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R. 15: pg. 60 (7-25)-R. 16: pg. 61 (1-4). Even the Appeals Board never found that
Guenon's conduct was intentional. It merely concluded that Guenon had "viewed and
maintained pornographic materials." See Addendum B. Because the City presented no
evidence of intentional conduct, it was improper for Guenon to be terminated on this
charge.
V.

THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN INCLUDING AS AN ELEMENT OF
TERMINATION GUENON'S DELIVERY OF A CD CONTAINING LEWD
PHOTOGRAPHS OF MIDVALE EMPLOYEES TO THE UTAH
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, IN LIGHT OF THE UTAH
PROTECTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ACT.
One of the five cited reasons for the City's termination of Guenon is that Guenon

committed insubordination by:
Failure to follow chain of command, namely delivery of a DVD/CD
to the attorney general's office and making complaints against
fellow officers.
R. 223. The City alleges that in reporting purported criminal conduct directly to the
Attorney General, Guenon violated the following two policies:
Members have the authority to act consistent with their statutory
authority and within their specific assignment or as otherwise
required by a specific situation. It is also the duty of each member to
know who his or her supervisors are in the chain of command and
obey all lawful orders...Each member is responsible to secure
supervisory assistance when necessary to determine appropriate
action, or when a situation requires resolution at a more appropriate
level in the chain of command.
R. 273.
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Critical offenses[:]...Insubordination, disrespectful behavior towards
a manager or supervisor or the refusal to obey a legitimate directive
from the supervisor or designated supervisor.
R. 275.
Some of the photographs Guenon found on his assigned computer depicted minor
children in the presence of a female officer wearing a sheer negligee that revealed the
officer's breast and nipples. R. 58: pg. 160 (25)-pg. 161 (1-7). As a law enforcement
officer of several years, Guenon was familiar with Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5, which
states in relevant part:
A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person...
intentionally or knowingly does any of the following to, or in the
presence of a child who is under 14 years of age:...exposes his or
her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola, the
buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area: in a public place; or in a
private place: under circumstances the person should know will
likely cause affront or alarm; or with the intent to arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of the actor or the child...
(emphasis added).
After reviewing the photographs, Guenon reasonably believed that they depicted
acts of lewdness involving a child, a class A misdemeanor. R. 58: pg. 161 (11-18).
Guenon contacted the Attorney General's Office.

R. 59: pg. 165 (2-4).

Jessica

Farnswoth of the Attorney General's Office discussed the allegations with Guenon over
the telephone and specifically requested that Guenon deliver the CD to her office for
review. R. 181. Ms. Farnsworth ultimately concluded that the photographs did not rise
to the level of child pornography. Id. However, Ms. Farnsworth did concur that the
photographs depicted "several adult females and young female children wearing
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negligee. In several of the pictures you can see through the negligee and see the breasts
of one of the adult females." Id.

Ultimately the Attorney General's Office, in its

discretion, declined to file criminal charges. Id.
Guenon's reporting was protected under the Utah Protection of Public Employees
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3(l)(a) (hereafter, "the Act"). The Act provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
An employer may not take adverse action against an employee
because the employee...communicates in good faith the existence
of... a violation of a law, rule, or regulation adopted under the law of
this state, a political subdivision of this state, or any recognized
entity of the United States.
It is undisputed that Guenon found photographs containing questionable content. That
content appeared to meet the elements of a criminal act; therefore, Guenon was reporting
a "violation of a law ... of this state." The Act prohibits the City from taking adverse
action (which clearly includes termination of employment) against Guenon for making
such a report. The fact that the Attorney General's Office declined to file criminal
charges does not affect Guenon's protection under the Act.
The City's contention that Guenon was insubordinate is not supported by the
language of the two policies to which the City cites. For example, the City does not
allege and presented no evidence that Guenon was unfamiliar with his superiors in the
chain of command. See R. 273. Likewise, the City presented no evidence that Guenon
ever disobeyed a direct order or acted disrespectfully to a superior officer. See R. 273,
275.

While the City policy does state that "each member is responsible to secure

supervisory assistance when necessary," that language is vague and ambiguous in that the
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phrase "when necessary" is never defined. R. 273. According to the language of the
City's own policies, Guenon's reporting of suspected criminal conduct to the Attorney
General was not an act of insubordination.
VL

THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN INCLUDING AS AN ELEMENT OF
TERMINATION GUENON'S REPORTING OF A PUBLIC SAFETY
HAZARD DIRECTLY TO THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO AND
FIREARMS, IN LIGHT OF THE UTAH PROTECTION OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES ACT.
The Appeals Board also upheld the City's fifth finding that Guenon committed an

act of insubordination by reporting "alleged ATF violations to ATF in lieu of reporting
the violations to City personnel." R. 223.
In late 2007, the City purchased 50 pounds of explosives which it began storing in
two different rooms located in the police station. R. 22: pg. 88 (10-14). The manner in
which the explosives were being stored was a public safety hazard and violated
regulations of the ATF, but was done so anyway because the City had insufficient funds
in its budget to purchase an approved magazine. R. 183-186. Captain Shreeve knew that
the City's storage of the explosives violated ATF regulations but did nothing to rectify
the situation because he "had many pressing items" at the time. R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25); R.
183-184.
Guenon first reported the ATF violation to his direct supervisor, Sgt. Marcelo
Rapella. R. 74: pg. 222 (18-25)-pg. 223 (1-7). Guenon then reported the violation
directly to the ATF. R. 63: pg. 180 (5-8). The ATF investigated the charge, found that
the City was in violation of two separate ATF regulations, and ordered the City to
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immediately move the explosives to an approved magazine. R. 185-187. In its report of
the incident, the ATF found as follows:
Midvale Police Department was storing 50 lbs. of explosives in two
separate closets that did not meet proper storage magazine
regulations.. .[The officers] were advised that the explosives material
needed to be moved at once due to public safety.
R. 186.
Guenon's supervisors knew of the ATF violations but failed to act due to the cost
of remedying the violation.

R. 23: pg. 89 (8-25); R. 183-186.

Therefore, it was

reasonable for Guenon to conclude that reporting the violations to his superiors would
have had no effect.

Regardless, Guenon's reporting was protected under the Act.

Guenon reported a "violation of a law, rule, or regulation" to the appropriate outside
agency. The Act prohibits the City from taking adverse action against Guenon for doing
so.
VII.

THE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT
TERMINATION OF GUENON WAS THE PROPORTIONATE AND
APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE FOR GUENON'S ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
OF POLICIES.
The Court must determine "whether discipline is appropriate and second whether

the particular discipline meted out is proportionate to the offense." Salt Lake City Corp.
v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com'n, 908 P.2d 871, 876 (Utah App. 1995). "[T]he
[Court] must make two inquiries when reviewing appeals brought by suspended or
discharged employees: "(1) do the facts support the charges made by the department
head, and, if so, (2) do the charges warrant the sanction imposed?" In re Discharge of
Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Utah 1986). "If the [Court] finds upon review that the facts
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support the charges against the [employee], then it must affirm the [City]'s disciplinary
action, unless it finds the sanction so clearly disproportionate to the charges as to amount
to an abuse of the [City]'s discretion." Id at 1363. In light of the evidence on the record,
termination was much too harsh of a punishment.
First, it is undisputed that in keeping identification cards in his vehicle, Guenon
was simply following the Department's common practice.

The City had never

disciplined another officer for violating the evidence policy, despite the fact that
identification cards were often littered around the police station. Second, the City did not
present any evidence to show Guenon intentionally viewed, solicited, or downloaded
pornography. All of the evidence suggests that (1) the few images found were sent
unsolicited to Guenon via email or Instant Messenger and (2) Guenon did not actively
seek after pornography.

Third, the City did not establish its claims of theft and

insubordination as a matter of law. Guenon never took possession of someone else's
property or deprived anyone of their property. The photographs that Guenon downloaded
had been abandoned by Sgt. Egan. Fourth, Guenon's acts of reporting violations of law
to the Attorney General and the ATF are protected under the Act. Guenon's conduct
does not rise to the level of insubordination as that term is defined in the City's policies.
Fifth, Guenon's exemplary record as a police officer tips the balance against
termination. Ogden City, 116 P.3d at 978; R. 188-213. In 2004 Guenon was honored as
Midvale's Officer of the Year. R. 214. On February 25, 2004, Guenon received a letter
of commendation for his proactive work on patrol which had "yielded drugs, guns,
warrant arrests, and stolen vehicles." R. 215. On September 1, 2003, Guenon received a
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letter of commendation for discovering a burglary in progress and single-handedly
apprehending the burglar. R. 216. Guenon always received outstanding evaluations from
his supervisors.

R. 54: pg. 143 (8-13).

The City did not present any evidence

questioning Guenon's extensive commendations.

For all of the foregoing reasons,

Guenon's termination was clearly disproportionate to his actions and an abuse of the
City's discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Guenon respectfully requests that this Court overturn
the Appeals Board's findings upholding The City's termination of Guenon. Guenon
further requests that he be reinstated as a Midvale City police officer with back pay from
the date of his termination.
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Utah Code
Title 67 State Officers and Employees
Chapter 21 Utah Protection of Public Employees Act
Section 3 Reporting of governmental waste or violations of law — Employer action — Exceptions.

67-21-3. Reporting of governmental waste or violations of law -- Employer action —
Exceptions.
(1) (a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the employee, or a
person authorized to act on behalf of the employee, communicates in good faith the existence of any
waste of public funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule, or
regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or any recognized
entity of the United States.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a), an employee is presumed to have communicated in good faith if
he gives written notice or otherwise formally communicates the waste, violation, or reasonable suspicion
to the state auditor. This presumption may be rebutted by showing that the employee knew or reasonably
ought to have known that the report is malicious, false, or frivolous.
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because an employee participates
or gives information in an investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other
form of administrative review held by the public body.
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the employee has objected
to or refused to carry out a directive that the employee reasonably believes violates a law of this state, a
political subdivision of this state, or the United States, or a rule or regulation adopted under the authority
of the laws of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States.
(4) An employer may not implement rules or policies that unreasonably restrict an employee's ability
to document the existence of any waste of public funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or
suspected violation of any laws, rules, or regulations.
Amended by Chapter 187, 1992 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 67_21_000300.ZIP 2,380 Bytes
« Previous Section (67-21-2)

Next Section (67-21-4) »
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Utah Code
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property
Section 404 Theft — Elements.
76-6-404. Theft - Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another
with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76_06_04040Q.ZIP 1,520 Bytes
« Previous Section (76-6-403)
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Utah Code
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property
Section 404.5 Wrongful appropriation ~ Penalties.

76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation — Penalties.
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another, without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily
appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of
possession of the property.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control by the actor is not
presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the
control of the property by any person.
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as provided in Section 76-6412, so that a violation which would have been:
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a third degree felony if it is
wrongful appropriation;
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class A misdemeanor if it is
wrongful appropriation;
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class B misdemeanor if it
is wrongful appropriation; and
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a class C misdemeanor if it
is wrongful appropriation.
(4) Wrongful appropriation is a lesser included offense of the offense of theft under Section 76-6404.
Amended by Chapter 48, 2001 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76_06_040405.ZIP 2,217 Bytes
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Utah Code
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 9 Offenses Against Public Order and Decency
Section 702,5 Lewdness involving a child.

76-9-702.5. Lewdness involving a child.
(1) A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under circumstances not amounting
to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, intentionally or knowingly does any of
the following to, or in the presence of a child who is under 14 years of age:
(a) performs an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;
(b) exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola, the buttocks, the anus, or
the pubic area:
(i) in a public place; or
(ii) in a private place:
(A) under circumstances the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm; or
(B) with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child;
(c) masturbates;
(d) under circumstances not amounting to sexual exploitation of a child under Section 76-5a-3,
causes a child under the age of 14 years to expose his or her genitals, anus, or breast, if female, to the
actor, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child; or
(e) performs any other act of lewdness.
(2) (a) Lewdness involving a child is a class A misdemeanor, except under Subsection (2)(b).
(b) Lewdness involving a child is a third degree felony if at the time of the violation:
(i) the person is a sex offender as defined in Section 77-27-21.7; or
(ii) the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section.
Amended by Chapter 354, 2009 General Session
Amended by Chapter 366, 2009 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76_09_070205.ZIP 2,545 Bytes
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ADDENDUM B

BEFORE THE MIDVALE CITY EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD

IN RE TERMINATION OF JACK
GUENON,
Appellant

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS

This matter was heard by the Midvale City Employee Appeals Board on
November 20, 2008 and December 1, 2008. The City was represented by Mr. Craig
Hall. The Appellant, Jack Guenon, was represented by Mr. Ryan Hancey. The Board,
having heard the testimony and reviewed the documents submitted, and being fully
advised, the Board finds that the following facts are relevant to this matter and have been
established by a preponderance of the evidence:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The Appellant was police officer with Midvale City.
2. On or about October 31, 2008 the Appellant's employment with Midvale City was
terminated for cause, subject to the appeal by Mr. Guenon to the City's Employee Appeal
Board.
3. An appeal to the Midvale City Employee Appeal Board was timely filed.
4. The Employee Appeal Board was properly constituted and the appeal hearing was
properly noticed and conducted to all parties.
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5. That Police Department General Order 13-1.A provides that all evidence and property
should be placed into evidence before the end of an officer's shift and that evidence and
property should not be stored in an officer's car.
5. That during his employment with the City the Appellant Guenon mishandled
evidence and or property of others that came into his possession, namely, as many as 44
driver's licenses, credit cards, state identification cards, immigration identification cards,
and Mexico identification cards, by keeping and maintaining these items in his police
vehicle in violation of Police Department General Order 13-1. A
6. That some of the documents were kept and maintained by the Appellant Guenon for a
substantial period of time, up to four years.
7. That other officers in the department also violated the General Order regarding
evidence and property by not placing some property and evidence such as ceased
personal identifications into evidence and by leaving various items such as driver's
licenses and other identification cards around the police department offices.
8. That the Appellant's violation of the General Order regarding evidence and property
was substantially more significant than what other officers may have done in both the
number of items kept in his car and the length of time that the items were kept by the
Appellant.
9. That the Appellant found and otherwise possessed private personal property, namely,
private vacation photos of another officer on DVD/CD and made copies of the photos and
distributed these copies to other individuals without the permission of the owner of the
photos.

2

10. That taking, coping and distributing the photos to others may be an act of theft and
misappropriation of property of another in violation of Police Department General Order
6.01.4 and City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 61 in that possession of the DVD/CD
which the Appellant copiedfromthe city's computer was not the Appellant's property.
11. That an employee does not have the right to copyfilesfromthe city's computer and
possess them. Appellant possessed at his home the copied DVD/CD for more than 6
months. Appellant indicated that the purpose of making a copy of the DVD/CD was
merely to give "shit" to the persons whose likenesses were contained in the photos.
12. That Appellant admitted that he wrote on the DVD/CD "Job Security".
13. That six months later that Appellant expressed some concern about the content of the
photos being a violation of law.
14. That the Appellant viewed and maintained pornographic materials on his City owned
computer between the months of November 2007 and August 2008 for non-departmental
purposes in violation of Police Department General Order No. 17-3 and City Policy
Computer Systems Internet and Electronic Communication Policy, pages 49 and 50.
15. The pornographic material was downloaded and viewed during the period of time
that the computer was in the possession of the Appellant, including July 27, 2008, the
date when the material was last viewed.
16. That the Midvale Police department operates like a paramilitary organization with a
set chain of command which officers are expected to adhere to.
17. That following the chain of command is important to the operation of a successful
police department.
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18. That following the chain of command requires that an officer who finds or suspects
misconduct of another officer or the department is expected to report hisfindingsand
suspicions to his direct supervisor unless the allegations concern that supervisor and in
that case to report up to the next higher supervisor.
19. That the Appellant failed to follow the police department chain of command by
delivering the DVD/CD which contained the vacation photos to the attorney general's
office and making complaints against fellow officers in violation of Department Policy
No. 106.5. and City Policy Standards of Conduct, page 61.
20. That the Appellant failed to follow the police department chain of command by
reporting an alleged ATF violations to the ATF in lieu of reporting the violations to City
personnel in violation of Department Policy No. 106.5. and City Policy Standards of
Conduct, page 61.
21. That delivery of the DVD/CD to third persons without first reporting the concerns
about fellow police officers was in violation of the understood "chain of command"
practice and policy of the department.
22. That if the Appellant felt the DVD/CD contained evidence of criminal misconduct of
another officer that the Appellant had the duty to report the alleged criminal misconduct
and deliver the DVD/CD to either a captain or the chief of police of the Midvale
department.
23. That the reporting of the alleged ATF violation directly to the federal agency, rather
than through police department channels, was made because of internal conflict with
various individuals of the department.

24. That Appellant, a trained firearms inspector, had the responsibility and opportunity to
report the alleged violation to his superiors.
25. That the failure to also report the potential ATF violation to his appropriate
supervisor was inappropriate and outside the normal chain of command.
26. That the Appellant was not disciplined because he reported suspected crimes to the
Utah Attorney General or suspected violations to the ATF but was disciplined for his
failure to report these suspected violation of rules and law to his supervisors and through
the appropriate chain of command.

BASED UPON THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT THE MIDVALE CITY
EMPLOYEES APPEALS BOARD CONCLUDES AS FOLLOWS:
A.

The Appeals Boardfindsthat the Appellant, Jack Guenon did violate Midvale

City and Midvale City pohce department policies and procedures and that termination of
his employment with the City is a proportionate and appropriate discipline for the
violations of policies; and
B.

That all personnel rules and regulations of governing the process of disciplining a

Midvale City and the police department employee were substantially complied with.
RULING
The Appeals Board, by majority vote taken on secret ballot, upholds the
termination of Jack Guenon as an employee of the City.
Dated and Signed for the Appeals Board this j Q day of

LSPCf^^f—

2008.
Chairman of the Midvale CityEmployee Appeal Board
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MIDVftLE
In the M i d d l e of Everything

CITY RECORDER'S CERTIFICATE
I, Rori L. Andreason, City Recorder in and for the City of Midvale, State of Utah,
do hereby certify that the enclosed Findings of Fact and Conclusions regarding the
Termination of Jack Guenon is a true and correct copy of the original document
signed by the Midvale City Employees Appeals Board Chairman.
Dated this 11th day of December, 2008.

fO&P^RorijL. Aiidreason,TYEVlC
City Recorder/Human Resource Director

ADDENDUM C

RYAN B.HANCEY (9101)
KESLER & RUST
Mclntyre Building, 2nd Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-8000
Fax: (801) 531-7965
Attorneys for Petitioner

IS THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JACK GUENON, an individual;
Petitioner,

PETITION FOR REVIEW

v.
MIDVALE CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation; and MIDVALE CITY
EMPLOYEE APPEALS BOARD;

Appeal No.
Midvale City Employee Appeals Board
Decision Dated December 10,2008

Respondents.
Notice is hereby given that Jack Guenon, Petitioner, by and through his counsel of record
Kesler & Rust, petitions the Utah Court of Appeals to review the decision of the Respondent
Midvale City Employee Appeals Board made in this matter on December 10,2008.
This Petition seeks review of the entire decision made by Respondent
Petitioner requests the court to direct the Respondent to prepare and certify to the court
its entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings and evidence taken in this matter.

<. n *day of December, 2008.

DATED this

KESLER^: RUST
RyariJa./ir^iice\
Attorneys for Petitioner
F:\DATA\Rhanc\F.O.P\Jack Guenon\PctReview.MidvaIc.doc
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below a true and
correct copy of PETITION FOR REVIEW this %?\ day of December, 2008.
j~~| Federal Express
. Mail
• Hand Delivery
f l Telefax/Email Transmission
S)
{
.
I

1 hULUxX. /^llh^^LtT

Craig Hall
One Utah Center
201 S. Main St., #2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Midvale City

